INSIGHT

A media cordon as a shield against the far-right? 

16 July 2024

Some countries, such as Belgium, have installed a cordon sanitaire and a cordon médiatique in an effort to prevent the far-right from gaining influence. Laura Jacobs from the University of Antwerp discusses how effective and feasible the strategies are long-term.

The effectiveness of disengagement strategies

Both types of cordons are integral to a ‘disengagement strategy’ designed to curtail the influence of the far-right in politics and society. But how effective are they? Research indicates that, alongside other factors such as internal divisions, lack of professionalisation, and organisational difficulties, the cordon médiatique has effectively halted the far-right’s consolidation in the Francophone political landscape. Combined with the political cordon sanitaire, it prevents the far-right from obtaining powerful positions and entering government, unlike in countries such as Italy, Sweden, or more recently, the Netherlands.

While a political cordon sanitaire aims to block the far-right from joining government coalitions, a media cordon serves as a preventive measure and a shield against growing normalisation. 

The success of the media cordon extends beyond a mere political agreement: it impedes far-right ideas from gaining traction and spreading in mainstream media. This significantly reduces the visibility of the far-right, hindering the dissemination of their ideas and preventing their leaders from gaining widespread publicity.

While a political cordon sanitaire aims to block the far-right from joining government coalitions, a media cordon serves as a preventive measure and a shield against growing normalisation. Together, these strategies form elements of a political opportunity structure that diminish the perceived effectiveness and legitimacy of far-right actors.

Implications and feasibility on the long-term

While the cordon médiatique is strictly maintained in Francophone Belgium, the rising success of the far-right in Flanders has led to a process of normalisation among journalists, citizens, and politicians. A study by Léonie de Jong confirms that in regions where the far-right has performed well at the ballot box, journalists have become more lenient in their coverage. Although Vlaams Belang is still not treated like other parties—receiving disproportionately less media attention relative to their vote share and being banned from infotainment shows—they are invited to political talk shows, debates, and news programs.

Journalists’ views have shifted, mirroring the growing public scepticism towards ostracisation measures against Vlaams Belang. A significant portion of the Flemish population—not limited to the far-right electorate—now questions the cordon sanitaire, considering it undemocratic. The cordon médiatique, in particular, faces increasing scepticism.

This raises questions about the feasibility of maintaining a cordon sanitaire, especially at the media level, in a context where the far-right is already well-established. These developments have implications for the generalisability and utility of ostracisation strategies in other contexts where the far-right is gaining ground, notably in France and Germany. There are various reasons to assume that installing a media cordon is practically impossible; a political cordon sanitaire might be more viable, but this depends on the willingness of other parties to ostracise the far-right, which has proven to be inconsistent.

A counterbalance in the social media era

In the contemporary era, far-right parties, including Jordan Bardella of Rassemblement National (RN) in France, have invested heavily in social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok. These parties have been early adopters of social media as a political communication tool, enabling them to bypass the traditional gatekeeping role of journalists. This approach provides a cost-effective, low-threshold means of communication, allowing them to interact directly with their electorate and reach a broad audience. Moreover, the news values of conflict and negativity, along with social media features such as virality, visual focus, and personalisation, align seamlessly with far-right discourse. Consequently, the feasibility of maintaining a cordon médiatique is questionable, especially when politicians already have a visible presence on social media and can communicate directly with their electorate without gatekeepers.

Rather than implementing a cordon médiatique, journalists should critically and sceptically cover the far-right, rigorously verifying facts and avoiding the adoption of far-right narratives.

It might be beneficial to cover the far-right while adhering to principles that counterbalance their discourse on social media. A significant risk is that far-right parties, often populist in nature and inclined to blame elites for societal issues, may exploit a cordon sanitaire to portray themselves as victims. From a freedom of speech perspective, a cordon médiatique is also controversial, as it treads a fine line between free speech and hate speech.

The major challenge of a cordon médiatique lies in its effectiveness as a preventive strategy to thwart the far-right from gaining ground. However, its impracticality appears when applied retrospectively in contexts where the far-right is already successful and prominent. Instead, rather than implementing a cordon médiatique, journalists should critically and sceptically cover the far-right, rigorously verifying facts and avoiding the adoption of far-right narratives. This approach includes refraining from giving disproportionate attention to issues predominantly owned by far-right parties.

Hence, while the political and media cordon offer preventive measures against the far-right’s rise, their long-term feasibility and adaptability to new political landscapes remain uncertain.