INSIGHT
The illusion of a public service broadcaster
27 June 2025
The Hungarian government has delayed a vote on a proposed law criticised for tightening control over independent media and civil society. In an Insight for PMA, Judit Bayer, Associate Professor of Media Law at the Budapest Business School, takes a look at public media in Hungary, exploring the discrepancies between laws regulating public broadcasting and how the government exerts its influence.
By Judit Bayer, Associate Professor of Media Law, Budapest Business School
The second Viktor Orbán government, which led between 2010 and 2014, in 2010-2014 transformed the entire constitutional system of Hungary, effectively removing checks and balances. Its first target was media regulation, including for public service media. After the wide international outcry against the unprecedentedly restrictive media legislation – by European standards –, the law underwent several minor changes in the following years, and the draconian fines were never used. Instead, the media landscape was gradually transformed by tools of discriminative licensing and state advertising, hostile takeovers, and relentless censorship of the state media (a.k.a. “public service”) throughout the third, fourth and fifth Orbán-government.
A legislative loophole
How can such a strict censorship exist within the strict legal culture of the European Union? The words of the law – at first sight – would fulfil all expectations of a public service media system, with stateda democratic supervision, a publicly defined remit, remit-related budget and its independent oversight.(2) However, a careful reading of the law reveals a malicious manipulation. The government has diverted the ultimate power for distributing funds and hiring executives to an institution that is under its control: the Media Council, which is the regulatory department of the converged telecommunication and media authority.
Read more: As EMFA’s implementation grows closer, why concerns over its effectiveness remain
On paper, the public service broadcasting corporation is the Duna Ltd., owned by the Public Foundation of Public Service, which is managed by a carefully set-up Board of Trustees. Those board members are elected by parliament, in a balanced manner, (with one extra member appointed by the Media Council, thus ensuring a majority – just to be safe). The remit is defined by a Public Service Body which draws up the Public Service Code. The CEO of Duna is proposed by the Media Council, who is then appointed by the Board of Trustees.
However, Duna Ltd. actually has no control over the financial resources and the workforce of the broadcaster., Instead, it is organised by the Media Support and Property Management Fund, or MTVA, which receives and allocates the public service budget defined by the parliament. Duna Ltd. is one line among many in the budget law about the Media Authority.
The illusionary public broadcaster
It is MTVA which employs the media workers — including editors — , and commissions content . In effect, MTVA fulfilss the role of the public broadcaster, while also managing Duna, the shell-company, which is a public service broadcaster in name only. All the democratic supervision attached to Duna remains deprived of its function, while MTVA, the real holder of the privilege, is not subject to any independent supervision.
“Severe deficiencies of media freedom and pluralism in any society render the citizenship more vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda.”
MTVA’s Director is appointed and employed by the head of the Media Council who is also head of the entire Media and Telecommunication Authority. The budget allocation of Duna is decided by MTVA, whereas the Public Service Budget Body may only provide an opinion – this is the closest it comes to supervision by the independent structure. The budget lacks transparency, with no clear breakdown of how much is allocated to specific programmes, genres, or areas. Not all production costs are covered by MTVA’s budget; external funding sources also contribute, with related suspicions of corruption. These supplementary amounts are already factored in by the management.(3)
The Board of Trustees has the right to appoint and dismiss the CEO of Duna, its Supervisory Board and auditor,; it also supervise its independence, and exercises further broad functions, subject to detailed rules. In contrast, the management of the MTVA is in the hands of a single person:, the head of the Authority, who is selected by the Prime Minister.(4)
Could the EMFA turn the table?
Could the new European Media Freedom Act be an effective tool against this abuse of law? Only if the investigations do not shy away from pointing out the discrepancy between an organisation on paper and organisation in function. For example, by paying attention to details such as the appointment and dismissal of those roles that hold de facto power over the allocation of resources, employment and programming decisions; by monitoring the actual content of the broadcaster; (5) and monitoring internal processes and decisions.(6) Scholarly researchScholarly research has recognised the importance and suggested methods to identify de facto independence.(7)
Severe deficiencies of media freedom and pluralism in any society render the citizenship more vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda. Ultimately, such media thwarts the democratic process and instead contributes to growing polarisation and hostility.
Footnotes
[1] Mérték stb. https://mertek.eu/en/2019/01/09/funding-for-public-service-media-in-hungary-a-form-of-unlawful-state-aid/
[2] As it is described in detail for instance by the Com-Com.
[3] https://mertek.eu/en/2015/11/07/the-darkest-corners-of-state-media-funding/
[4] The candidate is then symbolically appointed by the President of the Republic; as the sole candidate to the head of the Media Authority, the position is approved by Parliament with a simple majority. (Articles 111/A, 125 (1)
and 124 (1) of the Act on Media Services and Mass Communication.) In the first version of the law, this position was directly appointed by the Prime Minister for 9 years, with a mandate renewable unlimited times. Subsequent amendments made the mandate non-renewable.
[5] https://www.ecpmf.eu/fact-finding-mission-hungary-2019/, see also Polyák, Gábor (2022): Monitoring the independence of the media regulatory body as an effective enforcement mechanism for the implementation of the AVMSD. Journal of Digital Media & Policy, online first 4 August, https://doi.org/10.1386/jdmp_00106_1.
[6] https://www.szabadeuropa.hu/a/a-maffiaban-lehet-hasonlo-gondolom-ilyen-a-kozteve-belulrol-mtva-m1/30938814.html?fbclid=IwAR3E74e3bmj1v8evyaG7JkQSCUxW94u8cIcCOGIvFddPmp92iaRPbeeUKxw
[7] Hans Bredow Institute (2011): Indicators for Independence and Efficient Functioning of Audiovisual Media Services Regulatory Bodies for the Purpose of Enforcing the Rules in the AVMS Directive (INDIREG). Brussels: European Commission., Irion, Kristina & Roxana Radu (2013): Delegation to independent regulatory authorities in the media sector: A paradigm shift through the lens of regulatory theory. In: Wolfgang Schulz, Peggy Valcke & Kristina Irion (eds.): The Independence of the Media and its Regulatory Agencies. Shedding New Light on Formal and Actual Independence against the National Context, pp. 15–45. Bristol & Chicago, IL: Intellect, https://doi.org/ 10.2307/j.ctv36xvtk9.6
About the author
Dr. Judit Bayer is associate professor of media law and international law at the Budapest Business School, Hungary, and a Schumann Fellow at the University of Münster. Her research interest is in human rights, freedom of expression, media freedom and pluralism, and privacy. She has a PhD in constitutional law (internet regulation) and habilitation in constitutional law (data protection).
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